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Abstract:	At	present,	the	recommended	stance	to	take	regarding	Cyber	Security	is	to	assume	
a	state	of	compromise.	With	the	increase	in	Bring	Your	Own	Device	(BYOD),	the	Internet	of	
Things	 (IOT)	 and	 Advanced	 Persistent	 Threats	 (ATPs),	 network	 boundaries	 have	 become	
porous	and	difficult	to	defend	from	external	threats.	Modern	malware	is	complex	and	adept	
at	making	its	presence	hard	to	detect.	Recent	studies	have	shown	that	some	malware	variants	
are	capable	of	using	multiple	covert	communication	channels	for	command	and	control	(C2)	
and	data	exfiltration	activities.	Examples	of	this	level	of	covert	communication	can	be	found	
in	malware	 that	 targets	 Point	 of	 Sale	 (POS)	 systems	 and	 it	 has	 been	 hugely	 successful	 in	
exfiltrating	 large	 amounts	of	 valuable	payment	 information	 that	 can	be	 sold	on	 the	black	
market.	 In	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 cases,	malware	 needs	 to	 communicate	with	 some	 control	
mechanism	or	human	controller	in	order	to	coordinate	attacks,	maintain	lists	of	compromised	
machines	 and	 to	 exfiltrate	 data.	 There	 are	 many	 channels	 that	 malware	 can	 use	 for	 its	
communication.	However,	in	recent	times	there	has	been	an	increase	in	malware	that	uses	
the	Domain	Name	System	(DNS)	for	communications	in	some	shape	or	form.	The	work	carried	
out	in	this	paper	explores	the	extent	to	which	DNS	can	be	used	as	a	covert	communication	
channel	by	examining	a	number	of	advanced	approaches	that	can	be	used	to	 increase	the	
stealthy	nature	of	DNS-based	covert	channels.	Our	work	describes	 techniques	 that	can	be	
used	 to	 shadow	 legitimate	 network	 traffic	 by	 observing	 network	 packets	 leaving	 a	 host	
machine	(piggybacking),	the	use	of	statistical	modelling	such	as	the	Poisson	distribution	and	
a	 dynamic	 Poisson	 distribution	model	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 further	 conceal	malicious	 DNS	
activity	within	a	network.	The	results	obtained	from	this	work	show	that	current	DNS-based	
C2	 and	 data	 exfiltration	 approaches	 employed	 by	 malware	 have	 considerable	 room	 for	
improvement	which	suggests	that	DNS-based	covert	communication	will	 remain	a	realistic	
threat	into	the	future.	
	
Keywords:	Data	exfiltration,	covert	channels,	advanced	persistent	threat	(APT),	DNS,	botnet,	
command	&	control	(C2).	
	
1.	Introduction		
Recent	industry	reports	suggest	that	91%	of	malware	uses	DNS	in	some	shape	or	form	and	
nearly	60%	of	organisations	do	not	regularly	monitor	DNS	traffic	(Cisco	2016).	The	distributed	
and	 ubiquitous	 nature	 of	 DNS	 traffic	 make	 it	 an	 attractive	 and	 realistic	 communication	
channel	 for	malware.	Almost	all	other	network	communication	protocols	 rely	on	DNS	and	
while	other	protocols	can	be	switched	off	or	blocked	at	a	firewall,	 it	 is	often	impossible	to	
block	DNS	traffic	without	having	adverse	effects	on	network	services	and	functionality.	Since	
its	 original	 inception	 in	 the	 1980’s,	 the	 DNS	 protocol	 has	 changed	 very	 little	 and	 yet	 still	
manages	to	serve	as	the	telephone	directory	of	the	Internet	as	we	know	it	today.	It	would	
seem	obvious	to	log	and	closely	monitor	DNS	traffic	given	its	importance.	However,	logging	
and	monitoring	can	be	difficult	given	the	high	volume	of	DNS	traffic	(Gao	et	al,	2013)	and	the	
fact	 that	 enabling	 standard	 logging	 in	 many	 DNS	 servers	 can	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	
performance	(Edmonds	2014).	In	many	DNS	servers,	standard	logging	is	an	I/O	bound	process	
 
 
that	can	slow	down	response	times	to	the	speed	of	writing	to	a	hard	disk.	Even	small	delays	
in	 responding	 to	DNS	queries	 can	have	an	observable	 impact	 for	 end	users	 and	 so	 in	 the	
majority	of	cases,	DNS	logging	is	switched	off	in	favour	of	increased	performance.	
	
Malware	developers	are	all	 too	aware	of	 the	dependence	on	DNS	and	the	difficulties	 that	
organisations	can	have	 in	monitoring	and	harvesting	useful	 security	 intelligence	 from	DNS	
traffic	 logs.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	malware	 that	
exploits	 the	 DNS	 system	 (Brook	 2015.).	 Recent	 studies	 of	 malware	 such	 as	 MULTIGRAIN	
(Lynch,	Andonov,	Teodorescu	2016),	that	target	Windows-based	Point-of-Sale	(POS)	systems	
provide	clear	evidence	that	DNS	can	be	used	to	exfiltrate	large	amounts	of	valuable	payment	
data.	 Systems	 that	 process	 card	 data	 will	 often	 restrict,	 or	 entirely	 block	 HTTP	 and	 FTP	
network	protocols	that	are	used	for	data	exfiltration.		While	network	protocols	such	as	HTTP	
and	 FTP	 may	 be	 disabled	 within	 a	 restrictive	 card	 processing	 environment,	 DNS	 is	 still	
necessary	 to	 resolve	 hostnames	 and	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 blocked.	 The	 characteristics	 of	 the	
MULTIGRAIN	POS	malware	are	typical	of	most	malware	that	exploit	the	DNS	system,	in	that	
it	communicates	initially	with	a	C2	server	before	it	attempts	to	exfiltrate	payment	data	over	
DNS.	Analysis	by	Lynch,	Andonov,	Teodorescu	(2016)	has	shown	that	MULTIGRAIN	checks	its	
buffer	approximately	every	five	minutes	for	payment	data	and	exfiltrates	the	buffer	contents	
as	 a	 series	 of	 encoded	DNS	queries.	 Like	most	malware	 that	 exploits	DNS,	MULTIGRAIN’s	
persistence	relies	on	the	assumption	that	system	administrators	are	far	too	busy	monitoring	
HTTP,	 FTP	 and	 other	 network	 protocols	 to	worry	 about	 DNS.	 In	 this	 paper,	we	 suggest	 a	
number	of	 approaches	 to	 increase	 the	 stealthiness	 of	DNS-based	C2	 and	data	 exfiltration	
traffic.	We	propose	a	DNS	query	schedule	based	on	statistical	analysis	of	the	inter	arrival	times	
of	DNS	queries	captured	over	a	four-day	period	from	a	Passive	DNS	server.	We	show	that	the	
arrival	rate	of	DNS	queries	resembles	a	Poisson	arrival	process	and	we	propose	a	method	of	
constructing	a	dynamic	DNS	query	schedule	based	on	the	current	DNS	activity	levels	of	the	
host	machine.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	Poisson	based	query	 schedule	we	 implement	 a	querying	
strategy	 that	 piggybacks	 legitimate	 outbound	 DNS	 queries	 leaving	 the	 system	 and	 we	
compare	 and	 contrast	 the	 stealthiness	 and	 throughput	 of	 each	 approach	 against	 normal	
baseline	traffic.	Our	study	will	be	of	interest	to	network	administrators	who	are	concerned	
with	malware	that	uses	DNS	as	a	covert	channel	in	order	to	circumvent	network	security.	
	
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 2,	 we	 describe	 the	 basic	
mechanisms	 that	need	 to	be	 in	place	 in	order	 to	communicate	using	DNS	queries	and	we	
outline	 some	of	 the	constraints	and	 limitations	 in	using	 the	DNS	system	as	a	C2	and	data	
exfiltration	channel.	In	section	3,	we	analyse	a	four	day	long	Passive	DNS	log	and	show	how	
the	arrival	times	of	DNS	queries	resemble	a	Poisson	arrival	process	and	in	particular	how	the	
inter	 arrival	 times	 (deltas)	 between	 DNS	 queries	 are	 exponentially	 distributed.	 Using	 this	
analysis,	we	propose	a	dynamic	DNS	query	schedule	that	uses	deltas	that	are	exponentially	
distributed	based	on	the	current	DNS	activity	levels	of	the	host	machine.	In	section	3,	we	also	
outline	a	DNS	query	strategy	that	observes	network	activity	on	the	host	machine	and	only	
sends	outbound	DNS	queries	when	 it	detects	 legitimate	DNS	activity,	 thereby	blending	 its	
malicious	 traffic	 with	 benign	 traffic.	 In	 section	 4,	 we	 compare	 and	 contrast	 the	 data	
exfiltration	capabilities,	in	particular	stealthiness	and	throughput,	of	each	of	the	DNS	query	
schedules	 proposed	 in	 section	 3,	 by	 analysing	 results	 from	 a	 number	 of	 quantitative	
experiments.	Finally,	our	conclusions	are	given	in	section	5.	
	
 
 
2.	Constraints	and	Limitations	of	DNS-based	Covert	Communication	
In	 this	 section,	 we	 discuss	 the	 mechanisms	 required	 to	 carry	 out	 DNS-based	 covert	
communications	 and	 we	 outline	 the	 protocol	 constraints	 and	 limitations	 that	 must	 be	
adhered	to	when	transmitting	arbitrary	data	over	DNS.	The	mechanisms	and	infrastructure	
required	to	communicate	over	DNS	are	quite	simple	and	do	not	require	special	equipment	or	
skills.	Figure	1,	shows	a	basic	DNS	communication	scenario	were	an	infected	machine	sends	
covert	messages	to	a	malicious	DNS	nameserver	 in	the	form	of	encoded	DNS	queries.	The	
malicious	 nameserver	 strips	 out	 the	 encoded	 message	 and	 replies	 back	 to	 the	 infected	
machine	in	the	form	of	DNS	query	responses	in	order	to	complete	the	communication.	It	is	
important	to	note	that	outgoing	encoded	DNS	queries	do	not	have	to	be	sent	directly	to	the	
malicious	DNS	nameserver.	The	hierarchical	and	distributed	nature	of	the	DNS	system	will	
ensure	that	encoded	DNS	queries	are	routed	to	the	appropriate	nameserver	based	on	the	
domain	name	that	forms	part	of	the	query.		
	
Figure	1:	Basic	DNS-based	covert	communication	scenario.	
	
	
2.2	DNS	packet	size	and	fragmentation	
The	DNS	protocol	operates	at	layer	7	of	the	OSI	network	model	and	communicates	over	UDP	
using	port	53.	Therefore,	it	is	a	connectionless	protocol	and	packets	are	not	guaranteed	to	
reach	their	intended	destination.	From	a	malware	perspective,	this	means	that	all	DNS-based	
communication	must	originate	from	the	client	side	and	both	the	server	and	client	must	agree	
on	 some	 kind	of	 packet	 numbering	 scheme	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 arbitrary	 data	 can	be	
reconstructed	once	it	has	been	exfiltrated.	Packet	ordering	only	becomes	a	problem	if	the	
size	of	the	arbitrary	data	being	exfiltrated	plus	the	size	of	the	UDP	and	DNS	headers	is	larger	
than	the	maximum	size	of	a	DNS	packet	which	is	512	bytes	and	if	dropping	packets	is	not	an	
option.	
	
In	the	case	of	stealing	payment	information	from	POS	systems,	a	single	encoded	DNS	query	
might	 represent	 an	 atomic	 piece	 of	 payment	 information	 such	 as	 a	 16-digit	 credit	 card	
number	 plus	 a	 4-digit	 expiry	 date	 and	 a	 3-digit	 CCV	 number.	 In	 this	 case,	 there	 is	 no	
fragmentation	of	data	and	 the	 loss	of	a	 few	packets	out	of	many	 thousands	of	exfiltrated	
packets	is	not	a	major	concern.		
	
2.3	DNS	beacon	messages	and	data	exfiltration	
The	connectionless	communication	model	also	means	that	infected	machines	must	transmit	
regular	 beacon	messages	 to	 C2	 servers	 to	 alert	 them	 of	 their	 existence	 and	 to	 check	 for	
updates	or	 instructions	 from	cyber	 criminals.	Work	 carried	out	by	 Shalaginov,	 Franke	and	
 
 
Huang	 (2016)	 and	 the	 authors	 of	 this	 paper,	 Sheridan	 and	 Keane	 (2016),	 has	 shown	 that	
malware	and	freely	available	DNS	tunnelling	tools	such	as	IODINE	(Ekman	2006)	and	DNSCat	
(Bowes	2012)	use	periodic	beaconing	by	default	 (IODINE	~2secs,	DNSCat	~	5secs)	which	 is	
easy	to	detect	over	time.	In	the	case	of	the	MULTIGRAIN	POS	malware,	it	checks	its	buffers	
for	payment	 information	approximately	every	5	minutes	which	 should	 result	 in	a	periodic	
increase	in	DNS	activity.	The	periodicity	of	DNS-based	covert	channel	beacons	represents	a	
weak	point	 in	 the	 communication	 chain	 that	 can	be	easily	detected	once	DNS	 log	 files	or	
sample	traffic	is	available	for	analysis.	
	
2.4	DNS	query	name	restrictions	
According	 to	 RFC	 1035	 (Mockapetris	 1987),	 domain	 names	 can	 contain	 the	 set	 of	
alphanumeric	characters	a-z,	A-Z,	0-9	and	can	include	the	hyphen	symbol	but	domain	names	
cannot	start	or	end	with	a	hyphen.	Although	domain	names	can	contain	both	upper	and	lower	
case	characters	 they	are	not	case	 sensitive.	 In	addition	 to	a	 limited	character	 set,	domain	
names	are	also	limited	in	terms	of	their	max	length.	A	fully	qualified	domain	name	(FQDN)	
can	contain	a	maximum	of	255	octets	(bytes/characters)	of	which	253	are	usable	because	all	
FQDN’s	have	an	initial	length	octet	and	a	trailing	‘.’	character	that	represents	the	root	of	the	
domain.	This	represents	a	severe	limitation	in	terms	of	the	amount	of	data	that	can	be	packed	
into	upstream	communications	(DNS	queries)	as	data	must	be	encoded	in	a	way	that	adheres	
to	the	strict	character	set	rules.	Therefore,	in	order	to	transmit	arbitrary	data	over	the	DNS	
protocol,	 it	must	 first	be	encoded	using	base32	or	 some	other	encoding	 scheme	 that	will	
translate	data	(binary	or	text)	into	the	limited	character	set	allowed	by	the	DNS	protocol.	The	
observation	of	strangely	encoded	long	DNS	queries	can	in	themselves	be	a	tell	tail	sign	that	
DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	 is	occurring	 (Born	and	Gustafson	2010).	However,	 this	
type	 of	 observation	 requires	 deeper	 packet	 inspection	 that	 is	 often	 not	 an	 option	 when	
dealing	with	large	traffic	volumes.	
	
2.5	Summary	
In	terms	of	data	exfiltration,	DNS	would	seem	to	have	a	number	of	severe	limitations.	It	 is	
unlikely	 that	 DNS	 would	 be	 a	 malware	 developers	 first	 choice	 in	 selecting	 a	 covert	
communication	channel	 for	exfiltrating	 large	 files.	However,	given	 the	 right	 circumstances	
such	as	a	restricted	network	environment,	small	or	easily	fragmented	payload	data	and	time,	
it	is	possible	to	use	DNS	to	exfiltrate	a	large	amount	of	data	over	a	long	period	of	time.	In	this	
paper,	we	focus	on	traffic	blending	and	we	outline	two	techniques	that	focus	on	breaking	the	
periodicity	of	DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	in	order	to	avoid	detection.	
	
3.	DNS	Traffic	Blending	Approaches	
Malware	 that	 is	 designed	 to	 exfiltrate	 valuable	 information	 over	 DNS	 must	 maximise	 its	
throughput	 while	 ensuring	 that	 DNS	 traffic	 is	 not	 increased	 to	 levels	 that	 might	 raise	
suspicion.	 In	 terms	 of	 C2	 and	 data	 exfiltration,	 the	 relationship	 between	 throughput	 and	
stealth	 is	 inversely	proportional	 in	 that	an	 increase	 in	 throughput	will	 increase	 the	 risk	of	
detection	 and	 therefore	 reduce	 stealthiness.	 Therefore,	 techniques	 that	 camouflage	
malicious	DNS	traffic	with	legitimate	traffic	are	worth	exploring	in	terms	of	the	level	of	stealth	
and	throughput	they	provide.	There	are	many	causes	of	legitimate	DNS	traffic,	of	which	the	
most	common	are	Web	Browsing,	Email,	System	updates,	Antivirus	Software	and	third	party	
applications.	It	is	essential	to	have	an	understanding	of	how	legitimate	DNS	traffic	behaves	
 
 
on	a	particular	 system	 in	order	 to	develop	 techniques	 that	will	 camouflage	malicious	DNS	
traffic.	 In	 section	 3.1	 of	 this	 paper	 we	 analyse	 4	 days	 of	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	 that	 was	
recorded	using	 a	DNS	 server	 running	Berkeley	 Internet	Name	Domain	 (Bind9)	 and	dnstap	
(Edmonds	and	Vixie	2013).	We	use	the	results	from	our	analysis	of	this	data	in	the	following	
sections	of	this	paper	to	develop	DNS	query	schedules	that	blend	DNS-based	data	exfiltration	
traffic	with	a	host’s	legitimate	DNS	activity.	
	
3.1	Passive	DNS	log	file	analysis	
In	computer	networks,	a	common	assumption	 is	 that	packet	arrivals	are	 independent	and	
unpredictable	(Atefi,	et	al.	2016).	Traffic	measurements	are	useful	for	testing	actual	network	
performance	and	for	problem	solving.	Traffic	measurements	are	also	employed	to	develop	
abstract	traffic	models	that	can	be	used	to	allocate	network	resources	in	order	to	meet	quality	
of	service	(QOS)	targets.	In	this	section,	we	analyse	4	days	of	legitimate	DNS	traffic	that	was	
recorded	 using	 a	 Passive	 DNS	 server	 running	 Bind9	 and	 dnstap.	 The	 recorded	 traffic	
represents	a	24hr	view	of	DNS	traffic	from	hosts	on	a	college	research	network.	As	we	are	
interested	in	the	use	of	DNS	for	data	exfiltration,	our	study	focuses	on	the	rate	of	outbound	
DNS	traffic	(queries)	between	the	hours	of	9am	and	6pm	when	there	is	increased	network	
activity.	 	One	of	the	oldest	and	most	commonly	used	arrival	models	 is	the	“Poisson	arrival	
model”	(Williamson	2001).	Using	the	Poisson	model	traffic	is	characterized	by	assuming	that	
the	packet	arrivals	xn	have	the	following	properties,	where	the	probability	of	the	next	arrival	
xn	being	less	than	or	equal	t	is	P(xn	≤	t)	=	1-e-lt.	
1. they	are	independent	
2. they	are	exponentially	distributed	with	the	rate	parameter	l	
Figure	2	shows	a	kernel	density	estimate	of	DNS	query	deltas	 for	each	of	 the	 four	days	 in	
question.	As	can	be	seen	from	figure	1,	the	plot	of	DNS	query	deltas	for	each	day	resemble	a	
long	tailed	exponential	distribution	which	is	characteristic	of	a	Poisson	model.		
	
Traffic	 that	 is	 machine-initiated	 or	 timer	 driven,	 such	 as	 MULTIGRAIN’s	 ~5min	 payment	
exfiltration	schedule,	will	not	strictly	adhere	to	exponentially	distributed	inter	arrival	times.	
Therefore,	DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	schedules	should	ensure	that	inter	arrival	times	
are	 exponentially	 distributed	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 stealthiness	 and	 avoid	 detection.	 The	
following	 sections	 of	 this	 paper	 outline	 three	 approaches	 that	 can	 replace	 timer	 based	
communication	schedules.	
	
Figure	2:	Kernel	Density	Estimate	of	DNS	query	inter	arrival	times	recorded	between	9am	and	
6pm	over	a	four-day	period	using	a	Passive	DNS	server	running	Bind9	and	DNSTap.	
	
 
 
3.2	Traffic	blending	with	a	fixed	exponential	distribution	
Detecting	periodic	patterns	in	DNS	traffic	is	trivial	once	appropriate	log	files	are	available	to	
analyse.	 A	 naive	 approach	 to	 overcoming	 this	 periodic	weakness	 is	 to	 generate	 a	 pseudo	
random	schedule	whereby	the	time	between	DNS	queries	is	selected	at	random	from	a	range	
of	possible	delays.	The	problem	with	this	approach	is	that	the	pseudo	random	delays	will	form	
a	normal	distribution	over	time	and	it	 is	difficult	to	select	a	lower	and	upper	range	for	the	
random	delays.	According	to	work	carried	out	by	Butler,	Xu	and	Yao	(2011),	it	makes	more	
sense	to	select	the	delay	between	DNS	queries	from	an	exponential	distribution	that	is	scaled	
to	 resemble	 delays	 observed	 in	 some	 baseline	 traffic	measurement.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	observe	legitimate	DNS	traffic	in	order	to	calculate	the	mean	delay	between	DNS	
queries.	 The	 mean	 delay	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	 generate	 an	 exponential	 distribution	 that	
resembles	normal	network	behaviour	with	a	rate	parameter	of	l = mean delay.	Table	1	gives	
a	breakdown	of	delays	between	DNS	queries	recorded	from	our	four-day	Passive	DNS	traffic	
capture.	
Table	1:	Analysis	of	DNS	query	inter	packet	delays	over	a	four-day	period.	
Count	 Mean	 Std	Dev	 Min	 Max	 25%	 50%	 75%	
8048	 18.5	 248	 0	 7231	 0.01	 0.9	 9	
Using	the	data	gathered	in	table	1,	 it	 is	possible	to	schedule	covert	DNS	queries	with	inter	
packet	delays	drawn	from	an	exponential	distribution	with	a	rate	of	l = 18.5.	Figure	3,	shows	
an	exponential	distribution	with	a	rate	of	l = 18.5 and	the	pseudo	code	used	to	schedule	data	
exfiltration	over	DNS.	
	
 
While(bytes left to exfiltrate){ 
Encode and send DNS exfil packet 
Randomly select time delay T from 
distribution 
Sleep for T 
}	
Figure	3:	Exponential	distribution	based	on	four-day	Passive	DNS	analysis	and	pseudo	code	
for	exfiltration	schedule.	
3.3	Traffic	blending	with	a	dynamic	exponential	distribution	
One	weakness	of	the	traffic	blending	technique	discussed	 in	section	3.2	 is	 that	DNS	traffic	
does	not	have	a	constant	arrival	rate.	Exponential	distributions	based	on	historical	analysis	of	
DNS	inter	packet	delays	will	produce	traffic	patterns	that	resemble	legitimate	network	traffic	
in	the	long	term	but	will	not	reflect	short	term	trends	that	might	occur	from	hour	to	hour	or	
day	to	day.	A	data	exfiltration	schedule	that	models	short	term	trends	can	take	advantage	of	
periods	of	increased	DNS	traffic	by	exfiltrating	more	data	and	can	stay	under	the	radar	of	a	
system	 administrator	 during	 periods	 of	 decreased	 activity.	 The	 traffic	model	 discussed	 in	
section	3	can	be	modified	so	that	it	builds	a	dynamic	exponential	distribution	by	observing	
 
 
actual	DNS	traffic.		Figure	4	shows	an	exponential	distribution	generated	by	observing	actual	
DNS	queries	on	a	host	machine,	calculating	the	inter	packet	delays	(deltas)	and	adding	them	
to	a	circular	buffer.	A	circular	buffer	is	used	so	that	older	deltas	will	be	replace	by	newer	values	
when	the	buffer	is	full.	Figure	4	also	shows	the	pseudo	code	used	to	schedule	data	exfiltration.	
As	can	be	seen,	the	sleep	step	has	been	replaced	with	code	that	observes	DNS	activity	for	the	
time	period	T	which	is	randomly	selected	from	the	continuous	exponential	distribution.	
	
Create a small circular buffer 
containing initial exponential 
distribution 
While(bytes left to-exfiltrate){ 
Encode and send DNS exfil packet 
Randomly select time delay T from 
distribution 
Observe actual DNS traffic for 
time T, calculate inter packet 
deltas and append to circular 
buffer 
}	
Figure	4:	Exponential	distribution	based	on	a	1hr	exfiltration/observation	period	and	pseudo	
code	for	exfiltration	schedule.	
The	circular	buffer	effectively	acts	as	a	short-term	memory	that	reflects	the	most	recent	levels	
of	DNS	 traffic.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 circular	 buffer	 determines	 the	memory	 size	 and	 therefore,	
determines	how	reactive	the	exfiltration	schedule	is	to	short-term	trends.		
	
3.3	Traffic	blending	based	on	“piggybacking”	observed	traffic	
Assuming	that	a	piece	of	malware	has	the	ability	to	observe	DNS	traffic	on	the	host	machine,	
it	is	then	possible	to	“piggyback”	legitimate	DNS	queries	so	that	the	timing	of	DNS-based	C2	
and	 data	 exfiltration	 correlates	 with	 normal	 traffic	 patterns.	 The	 advantage	 to	 using	 this	
approach	is	that	malware	developers	do	not	have	to	create	traffic	models	that	resemble	an	
infected	 machines	 normal	 behaviour.	 The	 throughput	 of	 the	 “piggybacking”	 approach	 is	
heavily	dependent	of	the	level	of	network	activity	on	the	host	machine.	If	the	host	machine	
is	 busy,	 then	 many	 DNS-based	 C2	 and	 data	 exfiltration	 packets	 will	 leave	 the	 system.	
Conversely,	if	the	host	machine	in	quiet,	then	very	little	DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	
packets	will	leave	the	system.	
	
4.	Analysis	of	Traffic	Blending	Approaches	
In	this	section,	we	analyse	each	of	the	traffic	blending	approaches	discussed	in	section	3.	Our	
analysis	takes	the	form	of	a	series	of	one-hour	long	trial	runs	of	each	traffic	blending	approach	
were	the	throughput	is	measured	in	one	minute	intervals	and	compared	against	legitimate	
DNS	queries	during	the	same	one-hour	period.		
	
4.1	Fixed	exponential	distribution	and	“Piggybacking”		
In	our	first	experiment,	we	tested	a	fixed	exponential	distribution	with	l = 18.5 over the course 
of one hour. At the end of testing, 895 DNS-based data exfiltration queries left the host machine 
giving a communication ratio of 1:5 with legitimate DNS queries during the same time period. 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 5(a), data exfiltration queries are randomly distributed and 
significantly lower than legitimate DNS queries. The data exfiltration DNS queries are well 
camouflaged by legitimate traffic but the throughput is quite low, particularly at ~40mins where 
legitimate DNS activity is high. Figure 5(b) represents another hour-long experiment using the 
“Piggyback” blending technique. In this case, 3190 data exfiltration queries are sent giving a 
ratio of 1:1 with legitimate DNS queries. It is clear from figure 5(b) that there is a very close 
correlation between the timing of data exfiltration DNS queries and legitimate traffic. This is a 
useful feature in terms of stealthy behaviour. However, piggybacking high levels of legitimate 
traffic so closely exposes more data exfiltration traffic for analysis. In effect, every time a 
legitimate DNS query is sent there is a chance of being detected. 
	
	 	
(a)	 (b)	
Figure	 5:	 (a)	 Data	 exfiltration	 using	 fixed	 exponential	 distribution	with	l = 18.5.	 (b)	 Data	
exfiltration	based	on	“piggybacking”	legitimate	traffic.	
	
4.2	Dynamic	exponential	distribution	
In	our	second	set	of	experiments	we	obtained	results	for	the	dynamic	exponential	distribution	
exfiltration	schedule	by	running	three	hour-long	tests	with	varying	circular	buffer	sizes.		Figure	
6	shows	the	results	for	each	test	and	gives	the	communications	ratio,	number	of	exfiltration	
DNS	queries	and	the	buffer	size	used.	Figure	5(a)	shows	that	a	buffer	size	of	50	results	in	data	
exfiltration	 pattern	 that	 resembles	 legitimate	 traffic	 up	 to	 a	 ~40mins	 where	 there	 is	 a	
significant	spike	in	exfiltration	traffic.	The	spike	in	exfiltration	traffic	correlates	with	a	spike	in	
legitimate	 traffic	 but	 is	 far	 higher	 which	 explains	 the	 4:1	 ratio	 of	 exfiltration	 packets	 to	
legitimate	packets.	This	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	buffer	started	to	fill	with	smaller	
inter	 packet	 deltas	 as	 the	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	 spiked	 and	 as	 the	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	
decreased	 the	 buffer	 was	 not	 updated	 with	 longer	 inter	 packet	 deltas	 fast	 enough	 so	
exfiltration	traffic	continued	to	spike.	As	can	be	seen	in	figure	6(b),	a	buffer	size	of	500	results	
in	exfiltration	traffic	volume	that	is	higher	than	legitimate	traffic,	with	a	ratio	of	2:1,	but	does	
not	 contain	 any	 large	 spikes	 even	 though	 the	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	 has	 three	 spikes	 at	
~15mins,	~30mins	and	~45mins.		
	
In	figure	6(c)	we	can	see	that	increasing	the	buffer	size	to	1000	results	in	a	traffic	ratio	of	1:1	
and	an	exfiltration	traffic	pattern	that	closely	resembles	legitimate	traffic.	As	stated	in	section	
 
 
3.3,	the	circular	buffer	acts	like	a	memory,	so	increases	in	the	buffer	size	expand	the	memory	
capacity	flattening	out	any	short-term	traffic	fluctuations.	
	 	 	
(a)	 (b)	 (c)	
Figure	6:	Data	exfiltration	based	on	dynamic/continuous	exponential	distribution	with	
circular	buffer	size	(a)	50,	(b)	500	and	(c)	1000.	
4.2	Comparative	results	
In	this	section,	we	compare	results	obtained	from	all	three	traffic	blending	approaches.	The	
results	were	obtained	by	taking	the	average	of	five	one-hour	runs	for	each	traffic	blending	
approach.	As	can	be	seen	in	figure	7,	the	piggybacking	schedule	exfiltrates	638	packets	on	
average	 over	 5	 runs	 and	 while	 the	 Poisson	 and	 dynamic	 Poisson	 exfiltrate	 179	 and	 270	
packets.	 In	 terms	 of	 throughput,	 the	 piggybacking	 schedule	 wins	 out	 but	 this	 is	 largely	
dependent	on	the	level	of	network	activity	on	the	host	machine.		
	
Figure	7:	Comparative	results	for	each	traffic	blending	approach.	
The	piggybacking	approach	is	far	superior	when	it	comes	to	following	the	DNS	traffic	trends	
of	 the	 host	 machine.	 This	 characteristic	 is	 useful	 in	 terms	 of	 throughput	 but	 will	 have	 a	
negative	impact	on	stealthiness.	 It	would	be	relatively	easy	for	a	network	administrator	to	
detect	that	DNS	queries	for	the	same	domain	are	occurring	every	time	there	is	a	legitimate	
DNS	request.	
The	Poisson	 schedule	with	l = 18.5, exfiltrates the least packets but its throughput should 
remain constant regardless of the level of network activity on the host machine. If the host 
machines actual network activity levels have a mean DNS query rate of 18.5, then this approach 
should offer a moderate throughput while keeping exfiltration queries at a stealthy level. 
However, if the host machines network activity levels are significantly different to the mean 
used for the fixed exponential distribution then the traffic trend line for exfiltration packets will 
 
 
not blend with actual network activity. This will lead to far too many exfiltration packets 
leaving the host machine, or a less than efficient throughput. 
The dynamic exponential distribution schedule, using a circular buffer of size 1000 has a 
throughput that lies between the other traffic blending approaches. As this approach observes 
legitimate DNS queries it has the ability to adapt throughput and as a result stealthiness, based 
on the level of network activity on the host machine. As stated in section 4.2, the size of the 
buffer will determine how sensitive the exfiltration schedule is to legitimate spikes in DNS 
traffic. Using a dynamic exponential distribution to control delays between exfiltration queries 
offers a level of flexibility that a fixed exponential distribution and piggybacking cannot.	
	
6.	Conclusion	
In	this	paper,	we	have	discussed	some	of	the	limitations	of	DNS-based	data	exfiltration.	 In	
particular,	we	have	highlighted	the	periodic	or	timer	based	nature	of	DNS-based	C2	and	data	
exfiltration	 schedules	 as	 being	 a	 significant	 weak	 point	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 stealthy	
communications.	In	section	3.3,	we	have	demonstrated	that	is	possible	to	create	a	dynamic	
exponential	distribution	to	model	inter	packet	delays	that	can	be	used	to	schedule	DNS-based	
data	exfiltration	a	stealthy	manner.	In	addition,	we	have	shown	that	a	circular	buffer	with	a	
variable	size	can	be	used	as	a	kind	of	memory	of	recent	legitimate	DNS	activity	which	to	our	
knowledge	is	a	new	idea.	In	section	4	we	present	experimental	results	that	demonstrate	the	
data	 throughput	 and	 stealthiness	 of	 each	 of	 the	 DNS-based	 data	 exfiltration	 schedules	
covered	in	this	paper.	We	present	comparative	results	for	each	exfiltration	schedule	in	section	
4.2	which	show	that	a	dynamic	exponential	distribution	offers	reasonable	data	throughput	
and	can	at	the	same	time	blend	DNS-based	data	exfiltration	packets	with	legitimate	traffic.	
As	 an	 extension	 of	 this	 work	 we	 plan	 to	 carry	 out	 further	 experiments	 to	 gain	 a	 better	
understanding	of	how	the	circular	buffer	size	effects	data	throughput	and	stealthiness.	It	may	
also	be	possible	to	alter	the	circular	buffer	size	algorithmically	so	that	it	adapts	to	legitimate	
DNS	traffic	patterns	over	time.	
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